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THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL: 
POLICY REASONS FOR FUNDAMENTAL REFORM TO 




This article argues that it is highly undesirable that legal costs impede, and 
often preclude access to counsel. Even if access to counsel is not a 
constitutional right in itself, as the Supreme Court of Canada held in Christie, 
the arguments advanced by the plaintiff in Christie when supplemented by 
other considerations, establish the importance of access to counsel as a matter 
of policy. As such, the law societies and the governments of Canada ought to 
do more to promote access to counsel. Specifically, the law societies ought to 
reduce market-entry and market-conduct restrictions and increase the use of 
existing means; the federal and provincial governments ought to increase 
funding, provide for litigation insurance, and establish independent bodies to 
regulate paralegals and lawyers. This article explores the current dispute 






The costs of litigation, by way of fees and taxes, impede and 
sometimes even preclude access to justice to such an extent that a 
fundamental re-examination of how the government and the law 
societies fail to allow for access to the justice system is needed. The 
recent Supreme Court of Canada decision in Christie v. British 
Columbia [Christie]1 brought the problem into stark relief. This paper 
will argue that it is highly undesirable how legal costs impede, and 
sometimes even preclude, access to counsel. If access to counsel is not 
a constitutional right in itself as the Supreme Court of Canada held in 
Christie, the arguments advanced by the plaintiff in Christie establish 
                                                           
1 2007 SCC 21, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 873, 280 D.L.R. (4th) 528 [Christie].  
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the importance of the right to counsel as a matter of policy such that 
the law societies and the governments of Canada ought to do more to 
promote access to counsel. 
To make this argument this paper is organized in the 
following manner: Firstly, this paper will argue that the right to 
counsel is essential to access to justice and as such, to the rule of law. 
This argument was advanced by the plaintiff in the Christie case and 
is reinforced by a consideration of Dyzenhaus’ publicity condition of 
the rule of law. 2 To deny this condition would result in a denial of the 
public character of the law and the fundamental premise of the 
adversarial system. This denial would also support a tenuous 
distinction between the process and substance of the law as well the 
illusory distinction between positive and negative rights. Denying 
that access to counsel is fundamental to access to justice is tantamount 
to an abandonment of the principles of the rule of law. Secondly, this 
paper will suggest that the right to counsel is a constitutional right in 
itself with reference to the B.C.G.E.U. v. British Columbia (Attorney 
General) [BCGEU]3 as well as s. 7 and s. 15 of the Charter. The force 
of these arguments grounds a right to counsel, if not as a matter of 
constitutional necessity, then at least as a matter of policy. 
This paper will suggest that the law societies of Canada and 
the governments of Canada ought to do more to enhance access to 
counsel. A precondition to this argument is to present the alleged 
rationales for the existing regulatory structure that can be considered 
causes of high legal costs. The specific recommendations put forth in 
this paper are that the law societies ought to reduce market-entry 
barriers, decrease the duration of legal training and articling, facilitate 
mobility among legal professionals in Canada, and allow for the use of 
alternatives to lawyers. The law societies should also reduce market-
conduct restrictions by removing suggested or mandatory fees for 
professional services, removing advertising restrictions, and removing 
some of the restrictions on business structure. Finally, the law 
societies should encourage the use of existing mechanisms—such as 
contingency fees and alternative dispute resolution—that increase 
access to counsel. Finally, the government ought to enhance access to 
                                                           
2
 See David Dyzenhaus, Judging the Judges, Judging Ourselves: Truth, Reconciliation, 
and the Apartheid Legal Order, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003). 
3
 [1988] 2 S.C.R. 214 at para. 25, 53 D.L.R. (4th) 1 [BCGEU] 
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counsel by removing any taxes on legal services, increasing the 
funding for the legal system, establishing an independent body 
separate from the law societies to regulate paralegals, establishing a 
no-fault/no-tort accident compensation insurance scheme, providing 
litigation insurance, and requiring the law society to reform in the 
ways listed.  
In the interests of according the greatest attention and analysis 
to the issue of the right to counsel and its bearing on access to justice 
issues, this paper will be unable to address broader access to justice 
issues.4 Further, this paper simply points out that some combination of 
the above-mentioned recommendations would improve access to 
counsel, leaving the precise combination required undetermined, as 
that is beyond the scope of this paper. The effectiveness of the plain 
language movement, greater provision of free legal information, and 
any move to increase the number of students admitted to law school 




RIGHT TO COUNSEL IS AN ASPECT OF THE RULE OF LAW 
A. ENDORSEMENT OF ARGUMENTS MADE ON BEHALF OF THE 
PLAINTIFF IN THE CHRISTIE CASE 
The Supreme Court of Canada held in Christie that the right 
to counsel is not constitutionally protected as an aspect of the rule of 
law.  However, the arguments advanced in Christie on behalf of the 
plaintiff were strong enough to establish that as a matter of policy 
                                                           
4 Of course there are many differing ways in which access to justice is now 
understood. Rod MacDonald views access to justice in the sense of access to courts 
and to counsel as characterizing the first of five “waves” in the access to justice 
movement. Subsequent initiatives to promote access to justice have focused on 
institutional design, demystifying the law, enhancing preventative law, and providing 
for proactive access to justice. Roderick A. MacDonald, “Access to Justice in Canada 
Today: Scope, Scale and Ambitions” in Julia Bass, W.A. Bogart and Frederick H. 
Zemans, eds., Access to Justice for a New Century: The Way Forward (Toronto: The 
Law Society of Upper Canada, 2005) 20. 
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better protection ought to be afforded to this right. In the Christie 
decision the court conceded the fundamental importance of the rule 
of law, and further conceded that access to counsel can be an 
important aspect of the rule of law. Nevertheless, the Court asserted 
that the historical record, jurisprudence and constitutional text failed 
to confer an entitlement to counsel as a general constitutional right. 
This paper will examine the soundness of these arguments with 
respect to whether or not the right to counsel should be a right as a 
matter of policy, if not as a matter of constitutional necessity  
It is not obvious from the mere fact that the right to counsel 
has historically been denied that it therefore follows that the right to 
counsel is not a right since the fact that a society has failed to live up 
to certain ideals does not denigrate the importance of those ideals. 
While s. 15 claims require historical background to establish 
discrimination, simply because history suggests that no right exists 
does not mean that the modern conception of justice does not require 
access to counsel. One must consider that an argument that appeals to 
the status quo in order to justify the status quo is unpersuasive by 
virtue of being entirely circular. From a policy standpoint, it is 
evident that the historical record is not of over-riding persuasive 
force, given the numerous injustices that have been permitted to 
occur in the past. So the mere fact that something is supported by 
historical practice is not of overwhelming prescriptive value.  
 This paper seeks to analyze the Christie decision on policy 
grounds. However, it should be noted that there is judicial precedent 
that would appear to constitutionalize the right to counsel. As such, 
this jurisprudence shall be dealt with in the next section when this 
paper examines the extent to which the right to counsel is a 
constitutional right in and of itself.  
 After examining the constitutional text itself, the Supreme 
Court found that the rule of law does not encompass a constitutional 
right to counsel. While deference must be given to the Supreme 
Court’s decision, the argument put forth by Mr. Christie is still 
persuasive enough to be taken seriously on policy grounds. Firstly, the 
court recognizes that the Constitution expressly recognizes the right 
to counsel “on arrest or detention” but states that it would be 
redundant for the drafters of the Constitution to have included this 
provision under s. 10b if there were a general right to access to 
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counsel in any and all cases.5 This interpretation relies upon the 
assumption that the drafters were meticulous in their drafting and 
would not want to waste words were it possible to avoid doing so. 
Alternatively, it is possible that this section is there for emphasis, in 
view of its particular importance in the criminal context, and 
therefore worthy of explicit recognition. That being said, such a 
determination would not preclude a determination that the right to 
counsel is inherent in the Charter or the rule of law. This point can be 
elucidated by way of example, namely, the Charter fails to recognize 
the right to privacy in express terms, yet it has come to be understood 
as a nascent right in cases such as R. v. O’Connor .6  
 The Supreme Court of Canada’s understanding of the rule of 
law should include access to counsel. While it is true that “(t)he rule 
of law is one of the most evocative of those animating principles—on 
a par with federalism and democracy, an independent judiciary, 
respect for minorities and the protection of the most vulnerable of our 
society,”7 the Supreme Court of Canada feels that the rule of law only 
encompasses three principles. Firstly, the rule of law implies that the 
law is supreme.8 Secondly, the rule of law requires the creation and 
maintenance of an actual order of positive laws.9 Finally, the 
relationship between the state and the individual must be regulated 
by law.10 This paper will attempt to show that the rule of law must 
include access to counsel; any other definition of the rule of law is 
underinclusive.  
The right to counsel is inherent in the concept of access to 
justice, which in turn is inherent in the rule of law. The first point, 
that access to the courts is inherent to the rule of law is necessary for 
                                                           
5Christie, supra note 1 at paras. 23-25. 
6 [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411, 130 D.L.R. (4th) 235. 
7 Warren J. Newman, “The Principles of the Rule of Law and Parliamentary 
Sovereignty in Constitutional Theory and Litigation” (2005) 16 Nat’l J. Const. L. 175 
at 176 [Newman, “Rule of Law”]. 
8 Reference re: Language Rights Under s. 23 of Manitoba Act, 1870 and s. 133 of 
Constitution Act, 1867, [1985] S.C.R. 721 at para. 64-68, 19 D.L.R. (4th) 1. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Reference re: Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 161 D.L.R. (4th) 385; British 
Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Ltd. 2005 SCC 49, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 473, 257 D.L.R. (4th) 
193.  
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the term ‘law’ to be meaningful and is discernible from the three 
principles of the rule of law. According to the first principle of the 
rule of law—that the law is supreme—access to the courts is implied; 
if there were no access to the courts then the rule-making body would 
be supreme rather than the law. According to the second principle—
that there be the creation and maintenance of an actual order of 
positive laws—access to the courts is required in order for the term 
‘law’, as opposed to the arbitrary dictates of the rule-making body, to 
be meaningful. Finally, the third principle—that the relationship 
between the state and the individual be regulated by law—also 
requires that there be access to the courts since the alternative would 
imply regulation by fiat rather than law. By depriving citizens of 
access to the courts, rulers could simply pass whatever arbitrary laws 
they desired, break them as they saw fit, and thereby ensure that the 
relationship between sovereign and subject could not realistically be 
said to be regulated, or, if so, would be regulated by whim more so 
than law.  
The rule of law is a process whereby laws can be seen as 
‘legitimate’ and ‘regular’11 rather than ‘arbitrary’.12 This necessitates 
access to the courts. 
The Supreme Court of Canada in Christie seemed to be willing 
to accept the idea that access to the courts was inherent in the rule of 
law.13 The court also did not disavow the judgment passed in BCGEU. 
In BCGEU, the Supreme Court found that “(t) here cannot be a rule of 
law without access, otherwise the rule of law is replaced by a rule of 
men and women who decide who shall and who shall not have access to 
justice.”14 In BCGEU it was also held that:  
“(i)t would be inconceivable that Parliament and the 
provinces should describe in such detail the rights and 
freedoms guaranteed by the Charter and should not first 
                                                           
11 Arbitrariness is the antithesis of regularity and regularity is presupposed in the rule 
of law. See generally A. V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the 
Constitution, 10th ed. (London: Macmillan & Co. 1959) at 185 – 193. 
12 This is Griffiths distinction between “legitimacy” and “arbitrariness.” J A G Griffith, 
“The Common Law and the Political Constitution” (2001) 17 LQR 42 at 46. 
13 Christie, supra note 1.  
14 BCGEU, supra note 3. 
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protect that which alone makes it in fact possible to benefit 
from such guarantees, that is, access to a court.”15 
The court continues to make the claim more forcefully, stating: 
“Of what value are the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the 
Charter if a person is denied or delayed access to a court of 
competent jurisdiction in order to vindicate them? How can 
the courts independently maintain the rule of law and 
effectively discharge the duties imposed by the Charter if 
court access is hindered, impeded or denied? The Charter 
protections would become merely illusory, the entire Charter 
undermined.”16 
 
Nevertheless, because so many people represent themselves in court, 
the Supreme Court was of the view that a denial of the right to 
counsel did not impair access to counsel. The Supreme Court may 
have been sympathetic to the idea, as argued by the Crown, that to 
read a right to counsel into the unwritten principle of the rule of law, 
would be to make the rule of law into more than it is and to demean 
the importance of actual constitutional principles. On this point, 
Warren J. Newman states:  
“The principle of the rule of law, pivotal though it is as a 
basic value (some might well claim the grand norm) of the 
Canadian constitutional system, should not be assumed to 
operate in the same manner, or with the same direct legal 
force, as a provision of the Constitution of Canada. Whilst 
the rule of law can be invoked in furtherance of the 
interpretation and application of constitutional provisions, 
and can thereby influence—sometimes profoundly—the 
response as to whether a given statute or regulation is 
consistent with the terms of the Constitution, the courts 
should not, in my view, attempt to use the rule-of-law 
principle independently to invalidate such legislation.”17 
 
                                                           
15 Ibid at para. 24. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Newman, “Rule of Law”, supra note 7 at 186.  
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This view is unconvincing. The rule of law is required to 
ensure that the Constitution is respected, as maintained in BCGEU. 
Therefore, the rule of law necessarily governs the interpretation of 
the Charter itself. The fact that this makes the rule of law quite 
important is not an objection to this argument. If it is necessary (as it 
is) for the rule of law to be interpreted quite expansively in order to 
make sense of the Constitution itself, then so be it. There is no 
alternative. Access to the courts, in turn, is required for the rule of 
law to make sense, as previously articulated, and therefore no limits 
are imposed on mere access. However, access to counsel is required 
for the law to be properly understood, otherwise this access is simply 
illusory. In light of the complexity of the law, granting mere access 
without the right to counsel is relatively meaningless in the same way 
that granting mere access if the law were written in another language 
would be meaningless. Therefore, the Supreme Court’s view in 
Christie is mistaken because the right to counsel is inherent in the 
rule of law, since the right to counsel is integral to meaningful access 
to the courts. To say otherwise would be to grant an empty right, akin 
to granting the right to an all-you-can-eat restaurant devoid of food.  
More eloquently, the Canadian Bar Association stated that “without 
legal aid, access to justice is a hollow phrase, as many people simply 
cannot take advantage of their legal rights.”18 The rule of law is the 
very basis of a democracy, and presupposes meaningful access to the 
courts, which implies the right to counsel. Without the rule of law, 
the constitution itself would make little sense. The fact that the right 
to counsel is inherent in the notion of access to the courts, is evident 
from the complexity of the law, a point made clear by Dyzenhaus. 
 
B. DYZENHAUS’ PUBLICITY CONDITION OF THE RULE OF LAW 
IMPLIES THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
 Dyzenhaus finds two unwritten characteristics of the rule of 
law. Firstly, he finds what he refers to as the “publicity condition of 
law”, which is the idea that it is “inherent in the notion of substituting 
                                                           
18 Canadian Bar Association, News Release, “CBA Announces Legal Team to Lead 
Court Challenge on Constitutional Right to Legal Aid” (19 February 2005), online: 
<Canadian Bar Association http://www.cba.org/CBA/News/2005_Releases/2005-02-
19_lacounsel.aspx>. 
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or replacing arbitrary measures with legal rules that the rules be 
known....”19 He goes on to state that, secondly, “it is implicit in the 
notion of the Rule of Law that the state’s obligation is not one of 
merely disclosing the law, but rather one of disclosing the law in a 
fashion which makes it accessible to the individual....”20 This 
apparently involves positive assistance from the state since “...the fact 
that many citizens cannot, without the state’s assistance, respond to or 
cope with that law suggests the Rule of Law will be undermined if 
that assistance is not forthcoming.”21 Dyzenhaus’ contention is well-
founded. It is apparent that if it were a satisfactory solution to 
represent oneself in court, many more people would be taking 
advantage of this option rather than expending tens of thousands of 
dollars on legal fees. Unfortunately, self-representation is not a 
satisfactory solution. Indeed, the complexity and seriousness of a case 
may require access to counsel in order for the accused to receive a fair 
trial.22 The legal profession cannot `have their cake and eat it too’, 
either the law is complex and lawyers are necessary, or it is not, and as 
such, there is no need for lawyers. Clearly, the legal system feels that 
there is a need for lawyers, and so the complexity of the legal system 
must be conceded, and with that comes an admission that the right to 
counsel must be afforded protection. 
 
C. TO DENY ASSISTANCE WOULD BE TO DENY THE PUBLIC CHARACTER 
OF THE LAW   
The right to counsel is also apparent in light of a consideration 
of the public character of the law. The court has found the existence 
of a right to counsel in cases where the state is attempting to use its 
coercive power to infringe upon the liberty interests of an accused. 
However, there is no principled distinction for providing the right to 
                                                           
19 Canada, McCamus Commission, Report of the Ontario Legal Aid Review : A 
Blueprint for Publicly Funded Legal Services (Toronto: Queen`s Printer, 1997) 
(Chair, John D. McCamus) at 67-74 [McCamus, “Blueprint for Legal Services”]. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Anne-Marie Langan, “Threatening the Balance of the Scales of Justice: 
Unrepresented Litigants in the Family Courts of Ontario" (2005) 30 Queens L.J. 825 at 
844 [Langan, “Scales of Justice”]. 
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counsel in criminal cases but not in civil cases. Punitive or criminal 
penalties are not necessarily much more damaging than pecuniary or 
civil penalties. Both are extremely important to our existence as 
individuals. 
Firstly, the distinction between criminal and civil trials cannot 
rely on the fact that in criminal cases the state is directly involved in 
prosecuting the accused, whereas in civil cases the state is not directly 
involved. Such a formulation of the principle runs counter to the 
realities of society. The government or state is frequently involved in 
civil disputes and, more often than not, is the target of lawsuits. More 
importantly, even if it is not directly involved as a litigant, its 
involvement is still immense. This latter point is evident from an 
attention to the public character of the law. The state regulates all 
civil lawsuit activity. Moreover, as Owen Fiss has made clear, the 
regulation and implementation of the law is paid for with public funds 
in order to govern all of society.23 Therefore, it is not legitimate to 
simply let people purchase as much or as little justice as they are able 
to afford. Justice is not a private good available to the highest bidder. 
It is a public good necessary for the preservation of a free and 
democratic society.24  
Secondly, the proposed distinction cannot rely on the fact that 
in criminal cases the accused’s liberty interests are at stake whereas in 
civil lawsuits they are not. The problem with drawing this distinction 
is apparent by noting how a person’s liberty can be more adversely 
affected by a landlord-tenant dispute, an immigration hearing, an 
appeal for Ontario Works, CPP or OSDB or a suit in torts, than it is in 
a criminal matter.25 As was argued in the Report of the Ontario Legal 
Aid Review:  
 
                                                           
23 Owen Fiss, “Against Settlement” (1984) 93 Yale L.J. 1073 at 1085 [Fiss, “Against 
Settlement”]. 
24 Admittedly, in economics terms, justice could be conceived of as something other 
than a public good, in the sense of being excludable but that would distort the 
meaning of justice beyond recognition. The other characteristic of a private good is 
whether or not it is rival. Justice is not rival since by its very nature justice for one 
must be justice for all. If it were not, it would not be justice.  
25 McCamus, “Blueprint for Legal Services”, supra note 19 at 67-74. 
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“it is not difficult to imagine cases involving no risk of 
incarceration in which the claim for legal aid appears 
stronger than in some kinds of cases involving that risk. 
Thus, a young adult charged with a first offence who has 
difficulty communicating and for whom a conviction might 
result in a loss of employment and other negative 
consequences that may flow from acquiring a criminal 
record may appear to make a stronger claim for legal aid 
than someone who has been convicted several times before, 
faces an overwhelming and uncomplicated case, is able to 
communicate and is knowledgeable about the justice 
system, and risks only a short period of incarceration about 
which he or she is not particularly troubled.”26  
In addition, this report points out other instances in which liberty 
interests are at stake outside of the criminal context, such as refugee 
hearings, involuntary civil commitment of a psychiatric patient, 
family law disputes, and so on.27 Therefore, a consideration of the 
public character of the law reveals that the provision of legal counsel 
in criminal matters but not in civil matters cannot be maintained by 
appealing solely to the role of the state, since the state is intimately 
involved in civil trials. Further, the liberty interests at stake in civil 
trials can sometimes be jeopardized to an even greater extent. There is 
no principled reason to provide for the right to counsel only in 
criminal cases. As such, it is evident that, on policy grounds, the right 
to counsel ought to be afforded greater protection. 
 
D. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE PROCESS AND SUBSTANCE OF 
THE LAW IS TENUOUS 
The right to counsel must also be considered in light of the 
evolving common law.28 The Supreme Court of Canada held in 
Christie that there is a defensible distinction between the process and 
the substance of the law: the right to counsel is a procedural right that 
does not have constitutional status; the rule of law relates only to the 
                                                           
26 Ibid. 
27Ibid.  
28 Trevor C.W. Farrow, “Privatizing Our Public Civil Justice System” (2006) 9 News & 
Views on Civil Justice Reform 16 at 16 [Farrow, “Privatizing”]. 
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substantive content of the law.29 This view is unfortunate given that 
the rules of civil procedure, for example, are designed to facilitate the 
function, fairness, and equality of the law. Without proper adherence 
to and the full utilization of proscribed legal procedure, courts would 
be unable to produce well-reasoned and considered legal opinions. 
Without these well-reasoned opinions, the foundations of precedent 
would falter and result in the loss of confidence in the judicial system. 
It logically follows that the rule of law cannot be separated out from 
procedural fairness. Further, the common law is formed and advanced 
through judicial precedent. If landmark cases like Donoghue v. 
Stevenson had never been heard, then one might not have modern 
tort law.30 Therefore, the process of the law generates the substance of 
the law and so the two cannot be separated. 
 
E. THE ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM PRESUPPOSES THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
The importance of the right to counsel is evident from a 
consideration of the nature of the adversarial system. Underpinning 
the adversarial system itself is the idea that through the use of an 
adversarial system, justice is best achieved. Given the complexity of 
the law, experts in the law are needed. Thus, the adversarial system 
presupposes rough equality in professional standards and knowledge 
as between the parties engaged in the dispute; if this were not the case 
then it is difficult to see how justice could best be served by an 
adversarial system. However, a dispute in which one party is 
unrepresented upsets the balance of the system31 and will likely end 
up being unfair to the unrepresented litigant.32 A survey of 
unrepresented litigants conducted by Anne-Marie Langan revealed 
that they were significantly disadvantaged by this situation, having 
“difficulties drafting their own pleadings and filling out court forms, 
understanding court procedures and negotiating with opposing 
                                                           
29 Christie, supra note 1. 
30 Andrew Pirie, “Critiques of Settlement Advocacy” in Colleen Hanycz, Trevor 
Farrow & Frederick Zemans, eds. The Theory and Practice of Representative 
Negotiation (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2008) 278 [Pirie, “Settlement 
Advocacy”]. 
31 Langan, “Scales of Justice”, supra note 22 at 828. 
32 Ibid. at 839-40. 
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counsel.”33 Further, judges and court staff are often frustrated by the 
lack of knowledge of civil procedure and legal arguments on the part 
of the unrepresented litigant. 34 The right to counsel is important 
insofar as we believe in the value and efficacy of an adversarial 
system.    
A judge may attempt to rectify this inequity by providing assistance to 
the unrepresented party. This action would help preserve the 
integrity of the adversarial system insofar as the parties’ advocacy 
power would be roughly equal. However, the adversarial system only 
functions properly if it is governed by a neutral arbiter who decides 
between the two parties. Consequently, the independence of the 
judge is immediately drawn into question if the judge assists the 
unrepresented party. In essence, it is unfair to the opposing counsel35 
when a judge provides assistance to an unrepresented party.36  An 
unrepresented party draws into question the utility of the adversarial 
system itself. Justice, in a modern adversarial system, is best served by 
each party having access to counsel who can understand the law and 
advance the best interests of the client.  
 
F. DISTINCTION BETWEEN POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE RIGHTS IS 
ILLUSORY 
 The resistance to the provision of counsel may be founded in 
the traditional distinction between positive and negative rights. 
Unfortunately for the proponents of this view, this distinction is 
illusory. The traditional distinction between positive and negative 
rights holds that negative rights are pre-governmental rights—which 
are rights possessed prior to the institution of government—37 that are 
costless38 since they merely protect individuals from governmental 
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action, and are not protections afforded by the government.39 
Consequently, it has been thought that “(t)raditionally, the 
protections of the Constitution have been viewed largely as 
prohibition constraints on the power of government, rather than 
affirmative duties with which government must comply.”40 On this 
view, the government has no obligation to do anything,41 but if it 
chooses to act, it must merely “refrain from acts that deprive citizens 
of protected rights”.42 
Conversely, positive rights are thought to be post-
governmental rights that arise after the institution of government and 
that cost money by requiring affirmative action on the part of the 
government43  to act, provide, or protect.44 So it has been that in 
Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General), it was stated that “there is no 
constitutional right to protective legislation per se.”45 In Gosselin v. 
Quebec (Attorney General) it was found that “s.7 speaks of the right 
not to be deprived of life, liberty and security of the person, except in 
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice” and that 
“(n)othing in the jurisprudence thus far suggests that s. 7 places a 
positive obligation on the state to ensure that each person enjoys life, 
liberty or security of the person.”46 As a result, the court found the 
government under no positive obligation to help citizens, although 
they did leave open the possibility that such a duty may occur in the 
future, depending upon the case in question.47 Similarly, in Vriend v. 
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Alberta, the Court noted that positive obligations had not yet been 
found, (although the Court left open the possibility that positive 
obligations could be found in the future).48 In Christie the court was 
wary of the cost that would stem from recognizing a general right to 
counsel. They pointed out that the “fiscal implications of the right 
sought cannot be denied. What is being sought is not a small, 
incremental change in the delivery of legal services. It is a huge 
change that would alter the legal landscape and impose a not 
inconsiderable burden on taxpayers.”49 Unfortunately, rather than 
supporting the distinction between positive and negative rights, cost 
considerations eradicate that distinction.  
An analysis of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms shows, 
firstly, that many of the rights contained therein are positive even in 
the traditional sense, in that they are not pre-governmental and they 
require affirmative state action and therefore cost money. The legal 
rights protected under ss. 7 to 14 of the Charter, in some instances, 
demand affirmative action: s. 10 provides for the right to counsel 
when one has been arrested, s. 11 imposes the duty on police officers 
to supply information, s.14 requires the government to provide the 
assistance of an interpreter where warranted, and s. 1050 further 
imposes obligations on the government to ensure that a fair hearing 
transpires.51 Moreover, affirmative action by the state is mandated by 
the protections afforded to Canada’s official languages under ss. 16 to 
22 to take affirmative action in certain instances to ensure that both 
official languages are maintained in Canada.52 This is also true of the 
protections under s. 23 governing minority language educational 
rights. The democratic rights protected under ss. 3 to 5 of the Charter 
require affirmative action by the government in the sense that it must 
hold elections. 
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Most importantly, the remaining Charter rights as well as 
non-Charter rights under s. 26 of the Charter despite being considered 
to be ‘negative’ rights according to a traditional analysis, are actually 
identical to positive rights. This is the case because all negative rights, 
to be meaningful, are positive in the sense that they can only be 
enjoyed after the institution of government. That negative rights 
require state action is expressly recognized under s. 24 of the Charter 
which mandates that all of the rights contained therein be enforced.53 
For instance, the right to vote requires the provision of voting booths, 
the right to a trial by a jury requires a criminal justice system and so 
forth.54 As such, they are not pre-governmental, but are political 
rights, requiring substantial affirmative state action and therefore, 
state funding. The extent to which someone can enjoy a negative right 
is largely contingent upon the amount of money allocated to law 
enforcement, the judiciary, the criminal justice system and the various 
ministries that allow for the enjoyment of the right in question,55 
whether that be via providing deposit insurance, fire protection, 
assigning property rights, providing benefits to the populace at large 
in order to secure the requisite social solidarity of the populace, or 
other, more subtle means.  
In order to elucidate the point of this section, it may be of 
assistance to consider one of the archetypal negative rights, as 
traditionally defined, namely, the right to private property. This right 
is enshrined in the American constitution and, like the right to 
privacy, is implied in the Canadian constitution. Moreover, it is 
recognized under s. 26 of the Charter which affirms all pre-existing 
rights, such as the right to property as recognized according to statute, 
by virtue of registration, and common law principles. This right is 
identical to most positive rights since it is not pre-governmental, 
requires affirmative state action56 and therefore requires state funding. 
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Firstly, this right requires affirmative state action. The government 
must define, assign,57 interpret and enforce this right.58 As David 
Currie has pointed out “property, like contract, entails a right against 
third parties that is worthless without government help.”59 Without 
these actions this right would be meaningless. Most obviously police, 
fire departments, courts and prisons have to be paid for.60 Less 
obviously, this right may require the provision of benefits to those 
without property so as to ensure the continued compliance of the 
citizenry in respecting this right as well as the requisite maintenance 
of social cohesion so as to preserve confidence in the future, without 
which this right is meaningless.61 The preceding example highlights 
the fact that while rights protect citizens from the government, they 
also require governmental action to prevent, punish and deter 
nefarious actions taken by their fellow citizens. In this way, rights 
cannot be achieved simply by placing restrictions on what the 
government can do. In reality, they require action by the government. 
But all of these actions require funds and so these affirmative actions 
on the part of the state require funding. 
It should therefore be evident that there is nothing pre-
governmental about negative rights. The government as a whole is 
necessary in order to ensure that the citizenry can exercise their 
rights, since the government affords the citizenry with the necessary 
preconditions for the enjoyment of their rights. Absent the police, 
army, fire department, Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation and 
poverty reduction programs, to name but a smattering of 
governmental programs, then a Hobbesian state of affairs is all too 
likely to develop.62 Citizens would have little without the 
government;63 at best they would develop some sort of collective, 
defense-providing type of system. We would not all be “Robinson 
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Crusoe’s” on our own separate islands. Instead, we would still live 
with or near other people, but it is more plausible that in the absence 
of government, life would be “nasty, brutish and short.”64  All of the 
aforementioned services are provided by the government. 
Furthermore, they are unlikely to be provided by the private sector 
owing to the free-rider problem.65 So the notion that any right is 
costless is difficult to defend. At a minimum, rights must be enforced 
by the government since “the value of rights…directly depends on the 
availability of effective instruments for remedying violations of those 
rights.”66 Finally, in order for any right to exist all of the various 
branches of government have to be called upon in order to secure the 
necessary social cooperation to ensure that rights become a reality.67 
To use more Marxist terminology, “it is the function of the state and 
law to maintain the structure of productive relations by providing 
norms and institutions which allow those relations to flourish.”68 In 
fact, “even those constitutional duties which are most clearly phrased 
in the negative may be enforceable only through affirmative 
governmental exertions” such that “the portrayal of government as 
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passive and uninvolved is sharply at odds with the reality of 
government as pervasive regulator and architect of a vast web of 
social, economic, and political strategies and choices.”69 
An examination of the other Charter rights, and those 
protected under s. 26 of the Charter reveals how they too are actually 
positive rights, even if they have been traditionally understood as 
negative in nature. Briefly, they all require enforcement, and, in 
particular, s. 3 requires the expenditure of funds to hold an election, s. 
10 requires expenditure to ensure a fair hearing. More subtly, s. 2 
rights may require the government to afford protection of these 
rights. Importantly, s.7 and s. 15, on a natural reading would appear to 
protect positive rights, a contention that shall be addressed in a 
subsequent section of this essay. It is evident then that the Charter 
already affords protection to numerous positive rights, and that 
therefore, the right to counsel cannot be objected to based on the 
fictitious belief that the Constitution only protects negative rights, 
contra the majority’s view of the role of the Constitution as 
exemplified in Hunter v. Southam.70 
Therefore, the right to counsel cannot be objected to solely 
because it costs money, or requires affirmative state action, or is not a 
pre-governmental right. Admittedly, there are other reasons for the 
neglect of positive rights. On one view ‘positive rights’ cause more 
conflicts than negative rights because they have to do with the 
distribution of resources. 71 The courts have been frequent objectors to 
the notion that this would then immerse the court in the role of 
assessing policy, which is not their core area of expertise.72 Others 
object to positive rights because they are, apparently, aspirational in 
nature.73 Another reason for the inattention to the cost of rights is due 
to the belief that negative rights are worthy of more protection than 
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other interests that could be framed as positive rights. 74 However, 
none of these reasons are persuasive in light of an understanding of 
cost considerations.  
Positive rights are not more aspirational than negative rights. 
All rights cost money to protect. Therefore, all rights can always be 
protected to a greater extent. As a result, all rights are in a sense, 
aspirational.75  With the respect to the notion that to recognize the 
right to counsel would be tantamount to the court making a policy 
decision, this objection is quelled by a consideration of the importance 
of the right to counsel in a modern-day democracy in order for the 
concepts of access to justice and the rule of law to make sense. Also, 
the notion that ensuring access to justice is not an area of judicial 
expertise is tenuous. Furthermore, failing to consider budgetary 
choices, due to a deference to “executive privilege” is itself to make a 
choice in favour of the status quo. The “slippery slope argument is that 
by avoiding imposition of any affirmative duties, the judiciary can also 
avoid value judgments. The argument is fatally flawed because it fails 
to see the implicit value choices on which it rests and the 
impossibility of avoiding the question of values.”76  
Finally, the idea that negative rights, as traditionally 
understood, are more worthy of protection than positive rights is odd, 
since at the base of all other rights is the idea that every human being 
deserves respect and fair treatment by virtue of being human.77 Yet if 
all other laws are premised on this one principle, and if this one 
principle is not being achieved, then this is clearly a problematic 
situation. As Michael Ignatieff points out, “agency is the key idea in 
rights” which means “the capacity of individuals to set themselves 
goals and accomplish them as they see fit”78 yet minimal positive 
rights to food, clothing and shelter are necessary to have any agency.79 
In this way, negative rights are meaningless without a minimum 
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amount of positive freedom. Since negative rights are meaningless 
without government assistance, this assistance is provided, even 
though this costs money. It is plausible then that money should be 
provided for positive rights since positive rights are required in order 
to enjoy negative rights.80 In particular, the right to counsel cannot be 
objected to solely because it is a positive right, and, most importantly, 
given its importance, it should be afforded protection. Admittedly, it 
could be argued that in a democracy people are entitled to demand 
and receive precisely as much justice as they desire. However, despite 
the strong, majoritarian appeal of this view, substantive democracy 
requires a certain level of justice regardless of what individuals within 
that society may want. In much the same way, democracy requires 
elections regardless of whether or not the members of any particular 
democracy want elections. This necessarily entails, as Professor 
Farrow argues, that the importance of justice must always trump that 
of efficiency.81 
III  
RIGHT TO COUNSEL IS A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT IN ITSELF 
It has been argued that the right to counsel is very important and that 
it is inherent to the idea of access to courts which is inherent to the 
rule of law. However, it is also plausible that the right to counsel is a 
constitutional right in itself.  
 
A. THE SUPREME COURT’S REFUTATION OF BCGEU WAS LEFT 
LARGELY UNARGUED 
In the scant thirty paragraphs that the Supreme Court 
provided in the way of a judgement in the Christie case they did not 
succeed in differentiating the Christie case sufficiently from BCGEU 
which recognized a constitutional right to access to the courts. The 
Court reasoned in Christie that the government is entitled to pass laws 
with respect to the administration of justice, such as one that levies a 
tax on legal services. Yet this assertion was unargued and it is more 
plausible that the opposite is true. If it were the case that the 
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government could pass laws in relation to the administration of justice 
that preclude access to justice then there would be no point in saying 
that there was a right to access to justice in the first place. If there is a 
constitutional right to access to justice, then clearly the government 
cannot pass laws in relation to the administration of justice that 
curtail that right (subject to s.1). The tax in question was not ‘in 
relation to the administration of justice’ in the administrative sense (as 
would be the case with a rule setting judges’ salaries, their hours of 
operation, and so forth,) rather it precluded access in the case of Mr. 
Christie’s clients. The tax imposed on Mr. Christie led directly to Mr. 
Christie’s insolvency and the inability of his clients to receive legal 
counsel. In this way, the tax was equivalent to picketing in front of a 
courthouse in its effect and the Supreme Court failed to distinguish 
picketing from a tax precluding access to a lawyer.  
 
B. S. 7 GROUNDS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL  
It has been unconvincingly argued in the past, in large part by 
the courts of this country, that there is no positive duty upon the state 
to provide for the basic welfare of its citizens, including ensuring that 
the right to counsel is provided for. Margot Young has pointed out the 
absurdity of such a position by showing that “(t)he fundamental 
justifications of democracy, citizenship, individual autonomy, equality 
and justice that inform why we protect what we protect as 
constitutional rights are as strongly supportive of social and economic 
rights as they are of civil and political rights.”82 Nevertheless, the 
Supreme Court has not been persuaded by such arguments. For 
instance, in Dunmore v. Ontario, no constitutional right to protective 
legislation was found83 While in Gosselin v. Quebec it was found that 
“(n)othing in the jurisprudence thus far suggests that s. 7 places a 
positive obligation on the state to ensure that each person enjoys life, 
liberty or security of the person.”84 As a result, the court found the 
government under no positive obligation to help citizens, although 
they did leave open the possibility that such a duty may be found in 
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the future, depending upon the case in question.85 In light of the 
preceding discussion regarding the illusory distinction between 
negative and positive rights, it is evident that insofar as the state is 
obligated to respect negative rights, it can clearly be shown to have an 
obligation to provide for positive rights as well.  
Even if one were unaware of the similarity between positive 
and negative rights, it is sufficient to note that a natural reading of 
section 7 would appear to confer a right to counsel. This is apparent 
on two possible grounds. Firstly, the first clause in section 7 grants a 
right to life, liberty and security of the person, if this clause is taken to 
be free-standing, as Justice Arbour had argued.86 Secondly, in light of 
the public character of the law, as previously articulated, a denial of 
the right to counsel is tantamount to the state depriving a person of 
their life, liberty and security of the person.  
 
C. S. 15 GROUNDS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO COUNSEL 
It must be remembered that s. 15 allows for equality under 
and before the law as well as the equal protection and equal benefit of 
the law.87 In order to ensure that this is the case it would seem to be 
necessary to find a right to counsel, particularly in light of 
considerations that have been previously mentioned, such as the 
nature of the adversarial system. In addition, in Law v. Canada 
(Minister of Employment and Immigration), Justice Iacobucci stated 
that the purpose of s. 15 is to “prevent the violation of essential 
human dignity and freedom through the imposition of disadvantage, 
stereotyping, or political or social prejudice, and to promote a society 
in which all persons enjoy equal recognition at law as human beings 
or as members of Canadian society, equally capable and equally 
deserving of concern, respect and consideration.”88 Access to counsel 
is most necessary when human dignity and freedom are threatened. It 
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would seem to be the case then that s. 15 affords a right to counsel. 
However, discrimination can only be found if the court determines 
that an enumerated or analogous ground in s. 15 has been violated. 
The judicial interpretation of s. 15 so far has not envisaged income as 
analogous grounds of discrimination and, as such, it may appear to be 
the case that it is difficult to found a s. 15-based claim for the right to 
counsel. 
That being said, the court could still conclude that income 
should be an analogous ground of discrimination, as Faye Woodman 
has argued, owing to the fact that “low-income, the lower-class, or the 
underprivileged share many of the disadvantages of individuals with 
enumerated characteristics. They lack political power, and may 
constitute ‘discrete and insular minorities’.”89 There is at least a 
plausible argument to be made that the right to counsel is a 
constitutional right in itself, and as such, it should, from a policy 
standpoint, be afforded greater attention.     
 
IV  
CAUSES OF HIGH LEGAL COSTS – ALLEGED RATIONALES FOR THE 
EXISTING REGULATORY STRUCTURE  
It has been shown that the right to counsel is extremely 
important and that the legal costs that impede that right are highly 
undesirable If costs are one of the main barriers to access to the legal 
system then that which lowers those costs will likely be the most 
effective method of increasing access to justice.  Consequently, this 
paper shall presently extol the rationales underlying the self-
governing power and independence of the Law Societies of Canada.  
The rationales underlying the self-regulating power of the 
Law Societies of Canada and its independence are distinct. The 
general rationale underlying the regulation of lawyers is to protect 
consumers and to ensure the quality of services offered to them.90 The 
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general rationale underlying the self-regulation of lawyers is to 
protect the independence of the judicial system itself.91  
As set out in the Competition Bureau’s report,92 and supported 
by the vast majority of economists,93 an efficient allocation of 
resources stems from ensuring that goods are produced and purchased 
in the framework of a competitive market place, except in instances of 
market failure. Generally, competition serves the interests of the 
consumer since “consumers have access to the broadest range of 
services at the most competitive prices and that producers have the 
maximum incentive to reduce their costs as much as possible and meet 
consumer demand.”94  
Unfortunately, private markets are not always efficient. When 
they are not it is called an instance of ‘market failure’. Market failure 
is when a market fails to allocate resources efficiently. The four main 
types of market failure occur when a market actor is capable of 
abusing market power, when externalities are present, when the good 
in question is a public good, or when there is asymmetric 
information.95 In such cases regulatory intervention may be able to 
improve the market, but if carried out improperly, this regulation 
could have an anti-competitive effect that could worsen the 
situation.96 The two main sources of market failure in the provision of 
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A. ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 
 An information asymmetry occurs when there is an imbalance 
of information between two or more parties. The severity of this 
problem varies with the type of good that the consumer seeks to 
purchase. The quality of a ‘search’ good is apparent to the eventual 
consumer after it has been found, the quality of an ‘experience’ good 
becomes apparent to the eventual consumer after it has been tried, 
however, the eventual consumer is never fully capable of assessing the 
quality of ‘credence’ goods even after having experienced them.97 
Legal services are credence goods. When a consumer purchases legal 
services, that consumer is unable to tell—even after having received 
the legal service in question—whether or not the service was of high 
quality. This owes to the information asymmetry between the two 
parties. This information asymmetry, in turn, is what necessitated the 
purchase of the legal service in the first place.98   
 Asymmetric information, in turn, can lead to the problems of 
adverse selection and moral hazard. Adverse selection is the tendency 
for the mix of unobserved traits to become undesirable from the 
perspective of the uninformed party.99 In the case of legal services it 
would mean that there would be a tendency for firms to offer lower 
quality services (without a corresponding decrease in the price of 
those services) to their clients. They would be able to do this because 
their customers are unable to ascertain the quality of the services, 
because the consumers are purchasing a credence good.100 However, 
since consumers are also aware of their own inability to distinguish 
between high and low quality service providers, they will be 
unwilling to pay for high price goods out of a fear that high quality 
will not accompany that price.101 As a result, providers of the highest 
quality (and highest-priced service) may exit the market, leaving an 
overall pool of even lower quality service providers. This downward 
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cycle on prices and quality would continue until only the lowest 
quality services for the lowest price would be provided.102  
Asymmetric information can also result in moral hazard 
problems. Moral hazard is the tendency for people to act in their own 
interests rather than those of their clients. As a result, a client may 
prefer higher quality and higher cost legal services, but be provided 
only with high cost services of lower quality owing to the fact that, 
due to the information asymmetry, the consumer is purchasing a 
credence good. Alternatively, the consumer may desire a good of 
lower quality and lower cost yet the provider may still provide higher 
quality and higher cost services. This could easily transpire since the 
legal professional is responsible for evaluating the legal problem, 
suggesting the appropriate remedy and attempting to implement it, 
and therefore has a financial incentive to suggest an expensive remedy 
knowing full well that the client is not in a position to question such 
advice. If the client were able to properly question this advice, he or 
she would not be seeking the attorney’s services.103 
  Regulation of the legal market can correct for the adverse 
selection problem by providing market entry restrictions that ensure 
the provision of high quality legal services and thereby reduce the 
uncertainty about the quality of services that are paid for.104 
Regulation of the legal market can also correct for the moral hazard 
problem by providing market conduct restrictions by setting 
maximum prices or by ensuring a minimum standard105 that prevent 
legal professionals from exploiting their clients’ informational 
disadvantage.106 It should be noted that these problems are less acute 
for repeat users of the justice system, such as companies for whom use 
of legal services may be routine.107 However, for the average person, 
use of the justice system is infrequent.108 Admittedly, if a robust 
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system of information transfers between past clients and prospective 
clients of legal services could be implemented then this would 
diminish the problems that stem from the information asymmetry 
between clients and lawyers.109 However, the asymmetrical 
information problems that arise from the purchase of legal services 
result from the fact that the good being purchased is a credence good. 
As such, the transfer of information from consumers who have 
experienced the quality of this good from some suppliers will only 
mitigate and not obviate the information asymmetry problem.  
 
B. EXTERNALITIES 
 Externalities arise when the party purchasing a given product 
does not pay the true social cost of that product.  The total cost that 
accrues to society may diverge from the private cost paid by the 
consumer when there are externalities. There can be positive 
externalities—where a benefit accrues to a third party or society at 
large from the transaction in question—and negative externalities—
where a cost is imposed on a third party, or society at large owing to 
the transaction in question.110 In the context of the legal system, 
negative externalities can arise from low quality service, when poorly 
argued or incomplete cases are presented to the courts. Such cases 
result in poor quality decisions for the parties involved in the dispute. 
These decisions have a negative effect on society as well owing to the 
force of precedent. This, in turn, grounds the regulation of legal 
service providers to ensure that these providers attain a certain 
minimum standard that will protect the public at large from this 
effect. Further, high-quality services can result in positive 
externalities accruing to society at large in much the same as low-
quality services have negative effects. For example, well-argued and 
well-presented cases often result in higher-quality decisions from the 
courts simply because the court is more properly informed of the 
issues and the law in question.   
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V  
THE LAW SOCIETY SHOULD ENHANCE ACCESS TO COUNSEL: THE 
EXISTING REGULATORY STRUCTURE FAVOURS THE PROFESSION’S 
INTEREST OVER THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
The existing regulatory structure, in an effort to combat the 
asymmetrical information and externality-based problems inherent in 
the provision of legal services, has functioned, whether by intention 
or in effect, too much like a cartel, enacting regulations that are in its 
own interests but contrary to those of the public.111  
The theoretical need for regulation is clear. Most countries 
have conferred the regulatory power on the profession itself. In the 
proceeding section, an analysis of the various law societies’ regulatory 
effects on the legal services markets is undertaken.  
 
A. REDUCE MARKET-ENTRY BARRIERS 
Market entry restrictions have been erected to combat the adverse 
selection problems stemming from the information asymmetry 
between lawyers and their clients. Market entry barriers ensure that 
those who enter the legal profession are of high quality, thus 
preventing low quality professionals from practicing law. However, in 
economic terms, the regulation that has been enacted by the law 
societies of Canada appears to protect its members from competitive 
forces and thereby ensure, rather than correct for, market failure. As 
stated by the Competition Bureau: by “creating, enhancing or 
preserving the market power of incumbents” law societies ensure a 
lower supply of quality of services at higher prices than would prevail 
in a competitive.112  
The law societies have over-corrected for the potential 
problem of low quality lawyers to the detriment of those who would 
prefer to purchase service of a lower quality and also of a lower price. 
Further the law societies’ regulatory efforts have resulted in some 
consumers being simply unable to purchase any legal services 
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whatsoever.113 Such barriers protect incumbents and insulate them 
from outside competitive pressures, further lessening the quality of 
service.114 This is of benefit primarily to current lawyers and is not in 
the interest of the populace.  
 It is true that regulation ensures that the market will not fail, 
but the law societies have made excessive use of the regulatory 
methods available with severe consequences for access to counsel. 
This paper endorses the findings of the Competition Bureau: 
“jurisdictions that maintain higher standards than others should look 
to the outcomes of less regulated jurisdictions when defining the 
minimum necessary level of qualification.”115 
 
1. DECREASE DURATION OF LEGAL TRAINING AND ARTICLING 
 A barrier to entry employed by the law societies is the 
onerous legal training and articling required to become a lawyer. 
Lawyers in Canada must have completed at least two years of 
undergraduate education (although most have completed their 
Bachelor’s degree), a three year common law degree, (or, in Quebec, a 
civil law degree) and the bar admission course of the province in 
which the wish to practice.116 
The rationale for these standards is to ensure that lawyers are 
of high quality. However, if the goal of this exercise is to have high 
quality lawyers then that can be achieved through allowing law 
students to pursue optional additional accreditation. It does not make 
any sense to force all law students to complete all of the above 
requirements since it thereby forces all prospective buyers to buy 
legal services of a certain quality, with no regard for their own 
interests and preferences. Unless the law societies can demonstrate by 
more than simple assertion that these standards are the absolute 
minimum that are required in the public interest, then the duration of 
this accreditation process must be reduced. A reduced accreditation 
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period will decrease the salaries of lawyers and thereby increase 
access to justice. Such a development is in the public interest. 
 Firstly, it seems unlikely that the three years it takes 
to acquire a law degree are necessary in light of the fact that all of the 
required courses are completed by the end of the first year at most law 
schools. The result is that students end up with legal knowledge of 
areas in which they are never going to practice, paid for by their 
eventual customers. It is interesting to note that for any other service 
we do not demand the best, but rather simply the competent. We do 
not need the best plumbers, taxi cab drivers, school teachers, 
paramedics or lawyers; we need what is good enough from a societal 
perspective, not from the legal profession’s perspective. In addition, in 
light of the fact that in Quebec one can enter law school after a mere 
two years in CEGEP,117 either Quebec’s standards are far too low, or 
the rest of Canada’s are far too high. In light of the access to justice 
problem in Canada, the latter seems far more plausible. Finally, this is 
also true of the requirements for the bar admission course, which vary 
from ten weeks in British Columbia to a year in Alberta.118 The 
Competition Bureau’s excellent work on this matter is especially 
pertinent in this respect: “the FLSC did not provide the Bureau with a 
rationale for the dissimilarities across the country. Furthermore, given 
the National Mobility Agreement (see below), which allows lawyers 
to move freely among jurisdictions regardless of the legal training 
course or articling period required by their home jurisdictions, the 
reason for the discrepancies is not apparent.”119  
 
2. FACILITATE MOBILITY AMONG LEGAL PROFESSIONALS IN 
CANADA 
The National Mobility Agreement (NMA), which has been 
implemented by all provinces (except Quebec) allows for lawyers to 
temporarily practice outside of the province in which they are a 
member of the Bar. However, restrictions on permanently practicing 
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in that province are still great. The law societies should attempt to 
facilitate mobility among legal professionals so that they are best able 
to respond to changes in demand which will ensure an efficient 
allocation of legal service providers among jurisdictions and thereby 
enhance service and increase access to justice. In particular, the 
territories should sign the NMA.120  
The law societies should attempt to facilitate legal work by 
foreign lawyers by removing the restrictions that currently prevent 
foreign lawyers from practicing as foreign legal consultants. For 
example, the law societies should consider removing the requirement 
that foreign legal consultants have residency in the province in which 
they are offering advice.121 Increasing mobility promotes competition 
and is in keeping with broader international trends. For example, the 
European Union has been a concerted effort to eliminate such barriers 
in the legal profession, as well as other fields.122 
 
3. ALLOW FOR THE USE OF ALTERNATIVES TO LAWYERS 
Lawyers licensed by their respective law societies are the only 
ones who are permitted to supply continuing legal advice in Canada. 
The rationale for this should be familiar: to increase the quality of 
legal services. This is likely true, but it also restricts the supply of legal 
advice and increases the salaries of lawyers, thereby reducing access to 
counsel. 123 As recommended by the Competition Bureau, law societies 
should not prohibit related service providers—such as paralegals—
from performing legal tasks except in instances where there is very 
strong evidence to suggest that to do so would result in harm to the 
public. 124  
The arguments against the greater use of paralegals amount to 
the familiar worry over the likely reduction in the quality of legal 
services. This objection is not convincing. Consumers who wish to use 
the service of lawyers may do so, while those who wish to use the 
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services of paralegals may do so. It is already evident whether or not 
someone is a lawyer or a paralegal and the choice of the appropriate 
balance between the quality of the service and the price of that 
service should be left to the consumer, rather than to the law 
societies. In sum, the extent of market entry barriers have been 
demonstrated to be very beneficial to lawyer’s salaries. The same 
cannot be said of the public interest.125  
 
B. REDUCE MARKET-CONDUCT RESTRICTIONS 
Market conduct restrictions have been erected to combat the moral 
hazard problems stemming from the informational asymmetry 
between lawyers and their clients. These restrictions ensure that those 
in the legal profession conduct themselves in the interests of the 
public at large. The moral hazard problem stems from an exploitation 
of the information asymmetry problem by lawyers, which to some 
extent could be addressed through greater emphasis on ethical 
education for law students. Regardless, the current restrictions 
employed by the law societies of Canada impede access to counsel 
with no resulting benefit to consumers and therefore should be 
removed.  
 
1. REMOVE SUGGESTED OR MANDATORY FEES FOR PROFESSIONAL 
SERVICES  
British Columbia and New Brunswick set a maximum 
percentage to which lawyers are entitled under contingency fee 
agreements. This may be done to prevent the moral hazard problem of 
lawyers providing higher quality services, at higher cost, than is 
required by their client.126 Unfortunately, this measure also directly 
impedes access to counsel by preventing those clients with ‘riskier’ 
cases from having access to a lawyer since lawyers may be unwilling 
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to take on more risky cases127 unless the contingency fee is 
commensurate with the amount of risk. The necessity of the British 
Columbia and New Brunswick measures is dubious in light of the fact 
that every other province feels that this restriction is unnecessary.128 
These measures also diminish access to justice by reducing price 
competition as prices effectively converge on the maximum price.129 A 
much better solution to the potential for moral hazard would be to 
publish survey data of average prices.130 
 
2. REMOVE ADVERTISING RESTRICTIONS 
 Many of the law societies prohibit comparative advertising 
based on price, impose limits on the size, style and content of 
advertisements, and restrict the ability of professionals to advertise as 
specialists or experts in a certain field of law.131 Presumably these 
restrictions are in place to protect consumers from misleading or false 
advertising. Regrettably, these actions are superfluous given that 
misleading and false advertising is already prohibited under The 
Competition Act.132 More importantly the restrictions impair access to 
counsel by increasing lawyers’ fees at the expense of the public133by 
way of preventing prospective consumers from having access to 
pertinent information about the prices and types of services available. 
The restrictions that are currently employed—purportedly in the 
interests of preventing the consumer from the harmful effects of 
information asymmetry problems—seem primarily to exacerbate 
information asymmetries and have the undesirable consequence of 
lessening access to counsel.  
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3. REMOVE SOME OF THE RESTRICTIONS ON BUSINESS STRUCTURE 
 With the exception of Quebec and Ontario, multi-disciplinary 
law practices are effectively prohibited in Canada by virtue of the 
prohibition on others sharing in legal fees.134 The potential that a 
client’s bill may act as a cross-subsidy for another aspect of a multi-
disciplinary practice, or that there may be a conflict of interest within 
a multi-disciplinary practice, is a legitimate worry. However, such a 
worry is likely outweighed by the fact that such organizations have 
proven to be successful in Ontario and Quebec. A multi-disciplinary 
practice can help law firms raise equity and invest in capital that is of 
benefit to the consumer.135 Furthermore, such a practice creates 
economies of scope136 which can result in substantial cost savings for 
consumers137 and can thereby increase access to counsel. The 
Clementi report urged that the UK consider removing many of the 
restrictions on alternative business practices.138 The UK government 
broadly accepted the recommendations in the Clementi report139 and 
recently passed the Legal Services Bill.140In light of the severity of the 
current access to justice problem, it seems likely that the balance 
struck in Canada is not in the best interests of the public. 
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C. INCREASE THE USE OF EXISTING MEANS 
 This paper has proposed that the current lack of access to 
counsel is unacceptable and that fundamental reforms in the way the 
law is delivered to citizens would likely increase access to counsel. 
However, there is also substantial scope for increasing the use of 
existing means that have been shown to increase individuals’ access to 
counsel. 
 
1. CONTINGENCY FEES 
 This paper has addressed the point that maximum limits on 
fees lawyers may charge to clients likely impedes access to counsel by 
preventing lawyers from taking on cases that they may have taken on 
if the contingency fee was commensurate with the risk that they 
faced. This subsection makes a slightly different point: that 
contingency fees increase access to counsel by providing low income-
clients with access to counsel that they would not otherwise receive. 
This benefit is enormous and, as such, the use of contingency fees is to 
be greatly encouraged. Further, contingency fees address the moral 
hazard problem by ensuring that a prudent lawyer will no longer 
pursue a case when the costs outweigh the benefits since the lawyer’s 
fee derives from the potential award to the plaintiff.141   
 
2. ADR/SETTLEMENT 
 In light of the fact that between 92% and 98% of lawsuits 
settle,142 there is substantial scope for improving access to justice 
through the use of mediators. Mediators need not be lawyers143 and, as 
such, need not cost as much as lawyers. While the use of mediation 
fails to enhance access to counsel, this objection to the use of 
mediators is not a death knell; access to counsel is itself a means 
towards access to justice rather than an end in and of itself. To be 
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clear: if there is a more fruitful way of achieving justice, then that 
path should be pursued. When parties settle they mitigate numerous 
direct costs in terms of their time, money, disrupted lives, and 
emotional and psychological energy that would have been expended 
in a full-fledged court case. They also mitigate many of the indirect 
opportunity costs that stem from having to use their time at court 
rather than in another manner.144  
The main attraction of settlement is that it can allow for 
‘pareto-efficient’ results, wherein both parties are made as well off as 
they can be.145 Settlement functions in a more humane way. More 
attention is paid to the interests of those involved in the dispute and 
allows the disputants to adopt innovative solutions146 beyond those 
normally issued by a court but that nonetheless satisfy both parties to 
a greater extent than a court ruling might.147 Settlement also allows for 
parties to come to a better understanding of each other148 and can 
thereby help clear up disputes premised on a failure to a communicate 
or misattributions.149 Perhaps most importantly, settlement can ensure 
that disputes that are primarily resource-based, rather than rooted in 
principle, do not proceed to lengthy litigation.  
Unfortunately, ADR and settlement, rather than promoting 
access to justice, can actually deny access and dilute justice. ADR and 
settlement, when they have become the only realistically affordable 
option for parties, preclude access to the courts and thereby deny 
parties the opportunity to have their dispute ruled on by a judge. In 
effect, access itself is denied because there is no choice in how to 
proceed. Financial considerations prevent access to the courts.  
                                                           
144 Pirie, “Settlement Advocacy”, supra note 30 at 292-3. 
145 Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow, “Why Hasn’t The World Gotten to Yes? An 
Appreciation and Some Reflections” (2006) 22 Negotiation Journal  485 at 493 
[Menkel-Meadow, “Some Reflections”]. 
146 Ibid. at 487. 
147 Pirie, “Settlement Advocacy”, supra note 30 at 297  
148 B. Mayer, The Dynamics of conflict Resolution: A Practitioner’s Guide (San 
Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2000), at 8-21. 
149 W. Felstiner, R. Abel, & A. Sarat, “The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: 
Naming, Blaming, claiming...” (1980-81) 15 Law and Society Review  631, at 631-54, 
641.  
 73 
Alternatively, to the extent that access to ‘justice’ of a sort is 
granted, it is a diluted form of justice. As Owen Fiss has pointed out, 
“(t)o settle for something means to accept less than some ideal.”150 In 
this sense, ADR and settlement are far from ideal since, as this paper 
has previously made clear, the law should not arbitrate and enforce 
private interests but rather should uphold people’s rights. In law, 
someone either has a right or does not, and the other party either has 
offended that right or has not. There is no reason why those who have 
offended should be punished more or less than they deserve, nor that 
those who have been harmed should be compensated by the offender 
by more or less than they deserve. Each should be punished or 
compensated according to what the law requires. This is the 
imperative of justice and the rule of law, and also makes a peaceful 
democracy possible.   
In addition, the law is publicly created and uses public 
resources and so should not be used solely for private purposes 
without regard to societal interests. Owen Fiss notes that 
“adjudication uses public resources, and employs not strangers chosen 
by the parties but public officials chosen by a process in which the 
public participates.”151 He goes on to imply that these officials have a 
duty ”not to maximize the ends of private parties...but to explicate and 
give force to the values embodied in authoritative texts such as the 
constitution and statutes....”152 Professor Farrow expands this view by 
stating that a democratic society requires a justice system, not a 
private system of dispute settlement.153 Therefore, once the 
imperatives of justice are taken into account, it is obvious that 
settlement, while it may sometimes be ‘pareto-efficient’ for the 
particular members involved, is not pareto-efficient for society at 
large. 
 Similarly then, settlement is not ‘pareto-efficient’ for society 
at large because, as Professor Farrow notes, the rule of law and justice 
is integral to a democratic society.154 Yet settlement, by virtue of 
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having no precedent value,155 precludes the evolution of the common 
law156 and thereby diminishes the extent to which the rule of law 
governs our affairs. Yet the rule of law is integral to most notions of a 
democracy and was laid out as such in Reference Re Secession of 
Quebec.157 It is not convincing for proponents of settlement to point 
out that most settlements do not involve questions that would be 
likely to bring about a change in the law; it is logically impossible to 
know which case with which set of facts and circumstances will bring 
about a major change in law.  
Settlement would lose much of its appeal were it possible for 
access to justice to be truly secured. Therefore, if the law societies and 
governments refuse to adopt any of the other recommendations put 
forth in this paper then ADR and settlement should be encouraged. 
However, the main mechanism to promote access to justice is the 
courts. Such access to the courts requires access to counsel and 
necessitates that measures be taken that enhance access and preserve 
justice. Those measures have been the subject of previous sections of 
this paper as well as the sections that follow.  
 
VI  
THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD ENHANCE ACCESS TO COUNSEL: 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. REMOVE TAXES ON LEGAL SERVICES 
Cameron Murphy discusses tax deductibility as a way of 
securing greater access to justice.158 He considers removing the tax 
deductibility of legal fees across the board, or allowing individuals to 
deduct taxes so as to put them on par with corporations. 
It should be noted that taxes makes it possible to have access 
to justice in the first place, by making it possible to have courts, 
judges, and so forth. So getting rid of a tax on legal services generally 
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is merely a displacement of where people are taxed since, unless 
services are cut, the tax will have to be made up for elsewhere. 
However, a specific tax when one has to use legal services, as opposed 
to a general tax imposed on everyone, seriously limits access to justice 
by making it that much more expensive. Indeed, in the case of 
Christie this additional tax rendered him insolvent and unable to offer 
his services to his clients.  
 
B. INCREASE FUNDING OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM 
The state should increase funding to the legal system. Firstly, 
in light of the illusory distinction between positive and negative rights 
and the importance of many positive rights, it is important that legal 
aid be expanded beyond its current parameters.159 At a minimum, 
legal aid should be restored to its previous levels to address the 
increase in unrepresented litigants.160 Secondly, general taxes should 
be raised to allow for more courts and judges which will reduce 
waiting times and thereby increase access to justice. 
 
C. SIMPLIFY COURT PROCEDURES 
 The government of Ontario should be commended for its 
efforts to simplify the legal system. In order to simplify the system 
without decreasing quality, the Ontario government commissioned a 
report on civil justice reform, recently completed by the Honourable 
Coulter A. Osborne, which contains many excellent recommendations 
on how to streamline judicial procedure.161 For example, the 
Honourable Coulter Osborne recommended that time limits be 
imposed on pre-trial discovery hearings and that litigation budgets be 
set.  
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D. ESTABLISH AN INDEPENDENT BODY SEPARATE FROM THE LAW 
SOCIETY TO REGULATE PARALEGALS 
 In Ontario, paralegals are regulated under the Law Society Act 
by the Law Society of Upper Canada.162 The rationale for the 
regulation of paralegals is to prevent individuals from being taken 
advantage of by paralegals especially because the service offered is a 
credence good. The rationale for the regulation to be conducted by 
the Law Society is due to the fact that the Law Society is best 
equipped to assess the competency of prospective paralegals, since it is 
the expert body already charged with ensuring the quality of legal 
professionals. Unfortunately, this establishes a startlingly troubling 
conflict of interest between the interests of the Law Society of Upper 
Canada and paralegals. The Law Society has an obvious interest in 
restricting the scope of the paralegal practice. A professional group 
should never be regulated by its potential and, in some cases, direct 
competitors. Given the fact that the Law Society guards its self-
regulating power on the basis that lawyers must remain independent 
from the government in order to ensure the integrity of the justice 
system—if lawyers were regulated by the government the conflict of 
interest would be too great—it is surprising that the Law Society fails 
to appreciate the parallel argument with respect to the danger of 
paralegals being regulated by the Law Society. Paralegals should be 
regulated, but they should be regulated by an independent body 
separate from the law society. This prescription applies to jurisdictions 
other than Ontario as well.  
 
E. Establish No-Fault/No-Tort Accident Compensation 
Insurance 
A no-tort accident compensation scheme for personal injuries 
would diminish the severity of the access to counsel problem. Such a 
scheme, as seen in New Zealand, delivers better on the three goals of 
the tort system: deterrence, compensation and justice. By delivering 
superior compensation and justice, as well as equally good deterrence 
as compared to their previous tort system, the implementation of a 
system similar to that found in New Zealand could greatly reduce the 
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pressure on the justice system and allow more access to more needy 
claimants.  
Firstly, tort law has a negligible deterrent effect. The poor 
performance of negligence torts to deter is theoretically sound. 
Tortfeasors who were negligent do not foresee a possibility that their 
conduct could cause harm and persist in spite of that possibility as is 
true for reckless behaviour, rather, they simply “ought to have 
known” that their behaviour could cause.163 The empirical evidence of 
the deterrence of negligence is at best equivocal, as was conceded by 
Klar despite his spirited defence of tort law.164 In fact after New 
Zealand replaced their tort system with a no-fault accident 
compensation scheme there was no increase in the rate of accidents; 
motor vehicle accidents actually decreased.165 Further, even if tort law 
does have a deterrent effect, this role can be filled by other existing 
mechanisms, such as regulatory controls, professional conduct codes, 
penal and quasi-penal sanctions, and more effective penalty rating of 
insurance premiums.166  
 Most importantly, tort law fails to compensate people 
adequately; no-fault accident compensation compensates people to a 
much greater extent. Tort law, according to the Slater report,167 
affords no compensation to one-half to two-thirds (or 50%-66%) of 
injuries, is subject to enormous delay, is extremely inefficient by 
virtue of the transaction costs (court fees, administrative fees, legal 
fees) that use more than 50 cents of every dollar, as compared to 80 to 
90 cents of every dollar going to victims under no-fault,  and is akin to 
a lottery in that one’s injury must pass a series of tests, the results of 
which are not predictable. Klar disputed Slater’s contention that tort 
law was cost-ineffective, claiming that transaction costs only account 
                                                           
163 Non-negligence (i.e. intentional) torts are subject to criminal penalties that likely 
have greater deterrence than civil damages would. 
164 L. Klar, "The Osborne Report: "No" to No-Fault", (1989) 68 Can. Bar Rev. 301 [Klar, 
“No-Fault”].; Ontario, Ontario task Force on Insurance, Final Report of the Ontario 
Task Force on Insurance (Toronto: Ministry of Financial Institutions, 1986) at 301-
314, 309 (Chair: David W. Slater) [Ontario, “Slater Report”].  
165 Craig Brown, “Deterrence in tort and no-fault: the New Zealand experience” 
(1985) 73 Calif.L.Rev. 976 at 994. 
166 Ontario, “Slater Report”, supra note 164 at 60-70. 
167 Ibid. 
 78 
for 35.3% of expenses.168 Regardless, this percentage is still high 
compared to New Zealand’s administrative costs of 7% and ignores 
the fact that those who go uncompensated by tort law are entitled to 
no compensation whatsoever. 169 By contrast, as Palmer notes, New 
Zealand’s scheme offers comprehensive coverage at low cost by 
eliminating waste. Palmer notes that, in the realm of medical 
malpractice in the United States, only 2 per cent of injured patients 
receive compensation with only half of the funds awarded actually 
going to the victims.170  
Finally, it is argued that tort law better delivers justice. Some 
academics argue that tort law better reflects people’s view of justice by 
ensuring that, in the words of Klar, there is “some individual 
responsibility for individual actions, at least in a humanely modified 
form,” and that this “is central to what reasonable people regard as 
just.” This view is inaccurate and unfortunate. Firstly, many torts are 
already covered by some form of insurance which renders the 
corrective justice argument moot. Secondly, even if the tortfeasor does 
not have insurance, and is paying out-of-pocket, then corrective 
justice is still not achieved since the severity of the penalty enacted 
upon the tortfeasor is entirely contingent upon their financial 
situation rather than the wrongfulness of their act. Thirdly, the 
severity of the penalty is also contingent upon chance rather than the 
guilt of the tortfeasor, since a tortfeasor found guilty of negligence 
could end up causing a great deal of injury, very little injury or no 
injury depending upon chance. This means that the tortfeasor is made 
to pay primarily in proportion to chance rather than their own 
wrongdoing. Fourthly, the tortfeasor can be made to pay in no-tort 
schemes in any case through the use of penalty adjusted insurance 
premiums as well as quasi-penal, penal and regulatory measures. 
Moreover, the justness of corrective justice itself is debatable. The 
reason for why this is the case stems from the nature of negligence 
itself. Tort law makes the negligent tortfeasor pay since, as between 
an innocent person and a careless tortfeasor, a careless tortfeasor 
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should have to pay. However, carelessness is something that everyone 
is susceptible to, as Feldthusen notes.171 Someone who is negligent is 
not necessarily a terrible person. This factor, when considered in 
combination with the fact that tort damages can be more adversely 
punitive than a criminal sentence despite requiring a much lower 
standard of mens rea, means that tort law can sometimes be overly 
onerous on a tortfeasor. Most importantly, privileging corrective 
justice over compensation does not seem particularly just to the 
“statistically inevitable victims of injury” who are uncompensated.172 
It is evident that only those few who knew they were very 
likely to win a very large settlement benefit from tort law. These 
people are extremely rare. It is far more rational to prefer the no-tort 
compensation scheme since it is far more likely that one will be better 
served by such a system. It is this pre-accident perspective that must 
be the basis of informed policy choices173and not the post-accident 
perspective.  
It is also quite important that no-fault compensation 
eliminates the need for the use of race-based and gendered-
statistics.174 In tort law the defendant is not required to fix societal 
injustices, but only to put the plaintiff in the position that he or she 
would have been in but for the accident. Therefore, when calculating 
damages, judges rely on gendered and race-based statistics to calculate 
damages.175 Unfortunately, this practice treats people differently 
through no fault of their own but simply by virtue of their race or sex. 
It literally amounts to saying that one sex or race is worth more than 
one or the other, which is against the principles of human dignity, 
equality, and justice. Conversely, a no-tort accident compensation 
scheme, drawing as it does upon collective revenues would 
compensate individuals equally for identical injuries. It thereby fulfills 
the promise of all advanced, civilized societies: treating each and 
every member with the respect and dignity that they deserve 
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regardless of their race or gender, and fairly compensating and caring 
for those subjected to misfortune.  
 
F. PROVIDE LITIGATION INSURANCE 
Access to justice is such a problem that Justice Gomery 
described the current trajectory as “suicidal”, while Chief Justice 
McLachlin has repeatedly decried the sorry state of affairs.176 The goal 
of a civil litigation scheme would be to insure all individuals against 
the risk of law suits being brought against them and insure all 
individuals against the risk of having to use legal means to redress 
grievances. Therefore, funds would be provided to individuals to 
either defend a claim or mount a claim in the event that this risk 
transpires. The appropriate methods to ensure that people do not 
make excessive use of such an insurance scheme is a matter of detail 
that remains to be worked out, but could include limits on the 
number of claims an individual may make. This proposal is not 
optimal since it would bar people from being able to make legitimate 
claims if they had exceeded their quota. The reality is that most 
people make highly infrequent use of the legal system, so the 
likelihood of barring such claims is low. It is also true that ensuring a 
person for a few claims is better than not insuring anyone against any 
claims at all, as is the case currently.  
 The goal of civil litigation insurance is to ensure all 
individuals against risk. Risk, is not something that can be managed 
alone and, as such, gives rise to the need for insurance. Most people do 
not have legal insurance, hoping that they do not need it. Some people 
save for contingencies of this sort, but it is difficult to determine how 
much money to save, since an individual simply does not know if they 
will need to make use of the legal system or not. Fortunately, if the 
aforementioned individual were to seek insurance with a group of 
other individuals (a process known as risk-pooling) then the problem 
would be mitigated because of the law of large numbers. The law of 
large numbers states that as you average together more and more 
numbers in a certain range, the average becomes more and more 
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stable. This is why the CAW has purchased group litigation insurance, 
and the results so far, have been positive.177 
One strong objection to this proposal is that it is not obvious 
why such an insurance scheme must be required. The answer lies in 
the fact that people tend to discount their future. In essence, when 
the benefits of a proposal are far in the future, people tend to opt for 
smaller rewards in the present rather than larger rewards in the 
future. It is for this reason that people do not save enough, smoke too 
much and do not exercise enough. It is also for this reason that it is 
mandatory that people purchase health insurance through the 
government. 
It could then be objected that there is no reason for the 
government to provide this insurance rather than the private sector. 
After all, automobile insurance is also mandatory, yet it is provided by 
the private sector. Given that very little litigation insurance is 
provided at present it seems likely that this is an area of market failure 
ripe for public provision. If not, then insurance can be purchased 
through the private sector. What is important is that litigation be 
insured, because it is far too expensive to attempt to deal with the risk 
once it occurs. This proposal would increase access to counsel 
immeasurably. It may be difficult to get such a proposal passed, and it 
will take extensive study and strong resistance to established interests, 
but such was the same battle faced by every province in Canada 
before health insurance was implemented.178  
 
G. REQUIRE LAW SOCIETIES TO REFORM OR RISK LOSING THEIR 
SELF-GOVERNING POWER 
While it is clear that lawyers should be regulated and should 
be independent from the government, it is less clear why lawyers 
should be left to govern themselves. It is not necessary for lawyers to 
self-regulate in order to maintain their independence from the 
government. This could just as easily have been achieved by 
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conferring regulatory power over lawyers to an independent third-
party. Placing the suppliers of a service in the position of regulators of 
the supply of that service renders the law societies in a position akin 
to that of OPEC, where the suppliers of a service are also its 
regulators. In other words, the self-regulating power of the law 
societies effectively places lawyers in the position of members of a 
cartel.179 While the profession itself is in the best position to know 
what regulations would be in the public interest, the mere fact that 
the profession has knowledge of the public interest does not imply 
that actions will be taken in the public interest. 180 In light of the 
theoretical conflict of interest between the profession’s mandate to 
regulate in the public interest and its ability to engage in cartel-like 
behaviour, as well as the previously examined empirical results 
showing that the profession has engaged in regulation to the 
detriment of the public interest, it is manifestly evident that the law 
societies must undertake fundamental reforms to improve access to 
counsel. If not, the governments of the various provinces and 
territories of Canada should seize (by way of statute) the regulatory 
powers of their respective law societies. Adding to what has 
previously been said regarding the importance of the right to counsel 
in a modern democracy, Philip Slayton drives the point home stating 
that: “It is a scandal that most Canadians lack recourse to the law and 
the legal system, a vital part of government, because they cannot 
afford to pay legal fees. It is as if the right to vote in a general election 
were only given to those with an income above a certain level.”181 The 
Clementi report, largely enacted through the Legal Services Bill, 
recommends removing self-governing power from the law societies 
and providing that power to an independent regulator, the Legal 
Services Board, chaired by a lay-member.182 Admittedly, in England 
the body that represented the legal profession was also the one that 
was supposed to regulate it, in which case there was a more obvious 
conflict of interest there than in Canada where the Canadian Bar 
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Association fulfills the former function.183 However, while these 
organizations may be different in name, they have not acted 




 While this paper has attempted to detail some of the 
numerous methods available to increase access to counsel it has not 
focused on the effectiveness of the plain language movement and 
access to free legal information in terms of facilitating that transition. 
The failure to use plain language and provide free legal information 
restricts the understanding of the law by the populace184and thereby 
increases the severity of the lack of access to counsel problem.185 
Unfortunately, this complaint is not novel. Lawyers engage in debates 
of interpretation, such that difficulty in understanding the law may be 
inherent to the law itself. The effectiveness of facilitating greater use 
of plain language and providing more free legal information are topics 
beyond the scope of this paper, but, to the extent that it is possible, 
would appear to reduce the severity of the access to counsel problem.  
 Secondly, if either access to counsel is taken more seriously, or 
the prescribed incentivizing effects detailed throughout the rest of 
this paper do increase access to counsel, the increased demand for 
counsel will have to be met. As such it should seriously be considered 
whether or not increasing law school entrance class sizes will be 
necessary to address the needs of the Canadian population. Further, 
increasing the number of students admitted to law school in the first 
place may help mitigate the access to counsel problem since an 
increased supply decreases cost.186 While law schools take the best 
students, it does not necessarily follow that the depths of the possible 
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entrants who could do a perfectly competent job have been reached. 
This view is leant credence by the per capita enrolment rate variation 
across provinces. The proper balance between ensuring a sufficient 
number of future lawyers and maintaining a quality pool of students 
in law school should be struck and is an area ripe for future research. 
 Finally, it has been beyond the scope of this paper to assess 
what the optimal combination of the aforementioned prescriptions 





The importance of access to counsel in terms securing access 
to justice necessitates fundamental reform by the governments and 
law societies in order to promote access to counsel. This is evident 
from the arguments advanced by the plaintiff in Christie, which, 
when supplemented by the other arguments advanced in this paper, 
establish the importance of the right to counsel as a matter of policy, 
such that the law societies and the governments of Canada must do 
more to promote access to counsel.  
Building upon the arguments advanced by the plaintiff in 
Christie, this paper has argued, firstly, that the right to counsel is an 
integral part of access to justice, which in turn is integral to the rule of 
law. This view is reinforced by a consultation with Dyzenhaus’s 
publicity condition of the rule of law. To deny that access to counsel 
does not form part of the rule of law is tantamount to denying the 
public character of the law and the nature of the adversarial system 
which presupposes a right to counsel. Further, it relies upon a faulty 
distinction both between the process and substance of law and 
between positive and negative rights. Secondly, in addition to access 
to counsel forming part of the rule of law, it is also a constitutional 
right in itself, as is apparent from BCGEU and sections 7 and 15 of the 
Charter. 
Even if this paper has failed to demonstrate that access to 
counsel is a constitutional right either by virtue of being inherent in 
the notion of the rule of law or being a constitutional right by itself, 
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the force of these arguments should be sufficient to demonstrate 
that—on policy grounds—access to counsel ought to be secured. 
Access to counsel should be promoted by the law societies and the 
government of Canada.  
The law societies ought to reduce market-entry barriers by 
decreasing the duration of legal training, facilitating mobility among 
legal professionals and allowing for the use of alternatives to lawyers. 
Market-conduct restrictions ought to be removed as well, such as 
those on mandatory fees, advertising, and business structure. The use 
of contingency fees and ADR should, in certain circumstances, be 
promoted as well.  
The governments of Canada should promote access to counsel 
by removing taxes on legal services, increasing the funding of the legal 
system, simplifying court procedures, and establishing an independent 
body separate from the law societies to regulate paralegals. Further, 
litigation insurance ought to be implemented in addition to a no-
fault/no-tort accident compensation insurance scheme. Finally, a 
systemic failure on the part of the law societies to implement the 
suggested reforms should jeopardize the ability of the law societies to 
retain their self-governing power, which has been vested in them 
only insofar as they advance the public interest.  
It has been beyond the scope of this paper to assess the degree 
to which public legal information, pro bono work, and the plain 
language movement ought to be enhanced, though the case for these 
initiatives seems evident. In addition, the expansion of enrolment in 
law schools seems like a fruitful means through which access to 
counsel can be promoted. This paper has focused on objective, 
financial barriers to access to justice. Ensuring access to counsel is just 
the beginning of improving access to justice. Future initiatives to 
promote access to justice should seek to reduce educational barriers, 
physical barriers, and subjective barriers such as those stemming from 
language, culture, power, history, and systemic discrimination. 
Finally, the end goal of access to justice is much broader in ambition: 
to achieve substantive justice in terms of outcomes. In this light, 
access to counsel is a modest goal, but one whose urgency demands 
attention and the reforms prescribed. 
 
